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This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability 
experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic 
indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking 
instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010 
to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more 
severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity 
prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run. 
Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we 
find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the credit-
risk premium faced by businesses. 
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The severity of the banking crisis of 2007-8, combined with the fact that they are infrequent 
events, has led scholars to look increasingly to history in order to understand better the potential 
causes and consequences of banking instability (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Grossman 2010; 
Jordà et al., 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). However, such studies use a narrative approach 
in determining whether a crisis has occurred or not, making it difficult to differentiate between 
different levels of instability. This approach is also subjective in that there is divergence of 
opinion over what constitutes a banking crisis.  As a consequence, time-series analysis of the 
causes and consequences of banking instability is somewhat limited.  One way of overcoming 
these difficulties is to use bank stock prices to measure instability (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, p. 
8). In this paper, we adopt this approach by constructing a dataset of monthly British bank share 
prices covering a 181-year period, in order to develop a precise and continuous measure of UK 
banking instability over the long run.  
Our share-price dataset is used to address two key questions: (1) What are the 
macroeconomic indicators of instability over the long run? (2) What effect does banking 
instability have on the cost of credit?  We examine potential causes and consequences of banking 
instability using Granger causality tests based on vector autoregression (VAR) models. Firstly, 
we test which macroeconomic variables consistently act as good predictors of banking instability 
over our sample period. Secondly, we examine if there is a long-run historical relationship 
between banking instability and the credit-risk premium faced by firms. In order to measure the 
credit-risk premium for the UK, a new proxy is developed, using a hand-collected dataset of UK 
corporate bond yields. This, to the best of our knowledge, is the first long-run time-series test of 
the hypothesis that banking instability affects the cost of credit. 
Using our bank-share-price dataset, we find that although the British banking system has 
faced episodic bouts of instability at various points throughout the past two centuries, instability 
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increases significantly in the final quarter of the twentieth century. This increase in instability 
culminated in the 2007-8 banking crisis, which according to our share-price measure is on a 
totally different scale to all previous episodes of banking instability in the UK. Notably, several 
of the UK banking crises identified as such by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) do not manifest 
themselves in our data. Furthermore, using our measure, the classic nineteenth-century crises do 
not appear to be as severe for the banking system as standard narratives would suggest. However, 
this is not to say that these crises did not affect other parts of the financial system.  
 In terms of leading macroeconomic indicators of crises, our results imply that interest 
rates, inflation, credit growth, and equity prices have significant predictive power for UK 
banking instability over the long run. This suggests that the stability of these factors should be an 
important policy goal. 
Our study also provides the first evidence of a significant predictive relationship between 
banking instability and the credit risk premium over the long run. Furthermore, our long-run 
evidence suggests that the increase in the cost of credit following banking instability appears to 
be more severe and prolonged for smaller and more risky firms. This highlights the importance 
of maintaining channels of credit to small businesses following banking instability. A caveat to 
these results is that we use bond yields as a proxy for the cost of credit. In most cases, credit 
obtained through the bond market or from banks should be close substitutes, but it is possible 
that this is not always the situation and our measure of the cost of credit may be imperfect. 
The findings of this paper contribute to the literature on banking stability in several ways. 
First, it augments the literature on the frequency, severity and measurement of financial crises 
(Bordo et al., 2001; IMF, 1998; Caprio and Klingbiel, 1996; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; 
Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Taylor, 2012). It does so by developing a new measure of banking 
instability, which helps provide more of an idea of the scale of banking crises than the 
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commonly-used narrative approach. This approach suggests, that at least in the case of the UK, 
the extant literature overestimates the occurrence of severe banking crises.  
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic factors that make 
banking crises more likely to occur (Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998a; 1998b; 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Bergman and Hansen, 2002; 
Van den End, 2006, Davis and Karim, 2008; Schularick and Taylor 2012, Bordo et al. 2003). In 
particular, it does so by showing that over the long run, credit growth has been an important 
contributor to UK banking instability. However, unlike Jordà et al. (2014), we find little evidence 
that house prices contribute to banking instability over the long run. Although the housing boom 
was major contributor to the 2008 financial crisis, it was not an important contributor to most 
previous crises.  
Finally, this paper augments the literature which highlights the link between banking 
instability and the credit-risk premium faced by firms. It is the first long-run analysis of how 
banking instability affects the cost of credit, whereas most previous literature has focused on 
particular crisis episodes (Bernanke, 1983; Ding, Domac, and Ferri, 1998; Borensztein and Lee, 
2000; Hall, 2010; Krishnamurthy, 2010). The only other long-run view of crises and credit is 
Bordo and Haubrich (2010), who trace the effect of credit distress events on output in the United 
States from 1875 onwards. Similar to the findings of this extant literature, the long-run evidence 
from the UK suggests that banking instability is followed by an increase in the cost of credit 
intermediation.   
This paper is structured as follows. In section two, our hypotheses on the leading 
macroeconomic indicators of banking instability and the effect of banking instability on the cost 
of credit are developed. Section three discusses our data sources and methodology. Section four 
examines the evolution of British banking instability over the last two centuries. Section five 
analyses fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables around specific and noteworthy banking 
5 
 
crises and then presents Granger causality tests for the macroeconomic indicators of UK banking 
instability. Section six analyses the consequences of banking instability for the cost of credit to 
business. Section seven then summarises the main findings and concludes.   
 
2. Banking Instability: Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 Macroeconomic indicators of banking instability 
Banking instability can develop from the decisions made by banks in the peaks and troughs of 
the business cycle. During economic upswings, banks may underestimate the problems 
associated with asymmetric information, which may lead to over-lending and increased lending 
to risky projects. In such an environment, banks are susceptible to a sudden macroeconomic 
shock, which may decrease the ability of borrowers to repay. Thus, this potential ‘boom and 
bust’ nature of bank activities may lead to increased instability (Minsky, 1977; Gavin and 
Hausmann, 1996, p. 13; Grossman, 2010, p. 74; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, p. xxvii). Notably, 
many studies have found that rapid credit growth appears to be consistently associated with 
systemic banking crises (McKinnon and Pill, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen 
and Arteta, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2000; Logan, 2001; Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1998; 
Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche, 2001; Wong et al., 2010). In particular, cycles of over 
lending that drive or are accompanied by booms in equity and housing markets have been found 
to increase banking instability (Borio and Lowe, 2002; González-Hermosillo, 1999; Jordà, 
Schularick and Taylor, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, pp.158-160; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2008; Schularick and Taylor, 2012).  
In this paper, we hypothesise that credit growth and asset prices are associated with 
banking instability. In addition, changes in nominal interest rates and inflation can stimulate 
credit booms and sharp changes in asset prices (Alchian and Kessel, 1962), and may therefore be 
associated with credit booms. Flamini and Milas (2015) identify a positive relationship between 
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interest rate volatility and financial instability in the UK, US and Sweden. As the UK banking 
system has never heavily relied on foreign-currency-denominated debt, exchange rate 
movements should not result in increased costs of servicing such debt (Kaufman 1999, pp.15-
16). Notably, Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) find that currency problems are not an important 
cause of banking crises.  
It is possible that macroeconomic triggers are not endogenous to the banking system. For 
example, Gavin and Hausmann (1996, pp. 27-28) use the analogy of a chain to emphasise the 
macroeconomic roots of banking crises. When macroeconomic forces place strain on the banking 
system, the weakest banks are the ones most likely to fail, but it is the macroeconomic tension, as 
much as the weakness of individual banks, that causes the failures. In other words, 
macroeconomic shocks which are exogenous to the banking system make it unstable. For 
example, increases in the nominal interest rate may cause problems as borrowers may face 
difficulties in servicing their debt, which potentially increases the number of loan defaults and 
increases the probability of the bank being in financial distress.  
 
2.2 Banking instability and the cost of credit  
The economic consequences of instability in the banking system are potentially severe and far 
reaching (Bernanke, 1983; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006; Hoggarth et al, 
2002; Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Laeven, 2011; Deaton, 2012). Although there is little dispute 
about the economic costs associated with banking crises, the channels through which problems in 
the banking sector affect economic output have long been queried. Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) argue that banking difficulties can exacerbate the economic situation through the 
monetary channel due to a rapid decrease in the money supply and money multiplier. Another 
channel is the extent to which output is constrained by the effect that banking instability has on 
the availability and cost of credit.  
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Disruption of the banking system reduces the ability of banks to alleviate the asymmetric 
information problem effectively and efficiently (Mishkin, 1991; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 
1990; Bernanke et al., 1999; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Christiano 
et al., 2010). In addition, periods of distress may be accompanied by shocks to asset prices, 
which erode a borrower’s collateral-to-debt burden (Bernanke 1983; Bernanke et al., 1996). 
Banks, operating in an environment of increased uncertainty, face a dilemma of whether to reject 
those seeking credit, charge higher premiums, or a combination of both, as they attempt to 
recapitalise or reduce exposure to risky assets. This results in a higher cost of credit 
intermediation or credit-risk premium, particularly for small- and medium-sized borrowers 
(Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Calomiris and Mason, 2003).  
As banks have an advantage in assessment of credit risk through their developed expertise 
in screening and monitoring, alternative channels of credit are likely to have a similar increased 
cost of credit intermediation (Bernanke 1983, p.264).  In bond markets, credit-related 
components of yield spreads will increase, reflecting assessments of default risk, but also non-
credit components, such as increases in illiquidity of credit markets (Churm and Webber, 2007). 
Notably, Altman et al. (2010) highlight the causal link running from bank loan returns to bond 
returns during periods of distress. 
In this paper, we hypothesise that banking instability results in an increase in the credit-
risk premium on the corporate bond market faced by firms and that this increase is particularly 
severe for smaller firms.  Although our focus in this paper is on the credit channel, we also test 
for the presence of a monetary channel by analysing the effect of banking instability on the 
money supply.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
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Studies on banking crises over the long run generally use a narrative and binary approach in 
determining whether a crisis has occurred or not (e.g., Goodhart and Delargy, 1998; Bordo et al., 
2001; Grossman, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Valencia and Laeven, 2012; Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), for example, define a banking crisis as bank runs that 
lead to closure, merging or a public-sector takeover of one or more financial institutions or the 
closure, merging, takeover or public-sector assistance of an important financial institution. 
Following this approach, we could measure banking stability over the long run using bank failure 
data. We eschew this approach because bank failures do not mean that a banking system is 
unstable and may actually promote banking stability, as was the case in the UK in the nineteenth 
century (Baker and Collins, 1999). In addition, the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) definition 
includes financial institutions that may not be creating deposits or intermediating credit. In 
addition, in the case of the UK, there are long periods of time whereby we cannot be sure if Bank 
of England assistance was secretly provided or if distressed mergers occurred or were arranged.  
Consequently, in this paper, in order to assess quantitatively the long-run time-series 
variation in British banking instability, a new data-set of monthly share prices of British 
commercial banks for the period 1830 to 2010 is constructed. The reasoning here is that 
problems or uncertainty surrounding the banking sector, no matter the source, are likely to be 
reflected in bank share prices, assuming that markets are relatively efficient. 
The data-set starts in 1830 because prior to this, there were very few joint-stock 
commercial banks since banking incorporation law had only been liberalised in the mid-1820s.  
Foreign or colonial banks, which are registered in London, are excluded as they generally 
conducted the majority of their business outside of the UK.   
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Monthly share price data were hand-collected for all London banks from 1834 onwards, 
for all Scottish banks from 1830 onwards, and for all Irish banks for 1830-1921.
1
  English 
provincial banks (i.e., banks located outside a 65-mile radius of London) were relatively small 
and their shares traded infrequently until the 1870s. We have share price data for the provincial 
banks traded on the London Stock Exchange up until 1868 and share price data for all provincial 
banks from 1869 onwards.   Appendix Table 1 provides details on our data sources. Bank returns 
are equally-weighted and adjusted for events such as changes in capitalisation, stock splits and 
reverse stock splits. Our preference for equally-weighted returns arises from the concept that 
problems at smaller banks may highlight systemic issues. However, to ensure that our results are 
not being driven by our weighting methodology, we collected data on market capitalisation (see 
Appendix Table 1 for sources) to construct a value-weighted series. As can be seen from Fig. 1, 
there is little difference between the equally- and value-weighted series – the correlation between 
the two series is 96.1 per cent. Our results are robust to using the value-weighted series.    
The absolute value of average bank returns, a non-parametric measure of volatility, is 
used as the baseline measure of banking instability. Absolute returns have been shown to be a 
simple and accurate measure of volatility in time series data (Ding, Granger and Engel, 1993; 
Granger and Sin, 2000; Forsberg and Ghysels, 2007). Absolute returns are also more robust than 
other measures of volatility in the presence of large movements, such as booms and crashes 
(Davidian and Carroll, 1987; Cotter, 2004). Robustness tests are run using drawdown of bank 
returns, measured by the change in an index of bank returns from its previous historical peak, 
nominal bank returns, and volatility of bank returns, measured by the non-overlapping annual 
standard deviation of average monthly returns.
2
 
                                                          
1
 Since joint-stock banks could not establish in London until 1833 due to the Bank of England’s charter, the earliest 
share price for a London bank is August 1834.   
2
 For example, if we have a new peak in the index of bank returns in 2000 at 100, and the index closed at 80 in 2001, 
60 in 2002 and 105 in 2003, the drawdown each year would be -20%, -40% and 5% respectively. 
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As a key objective of this paper is to test potential macroeconomic indicators of banking 
instability as well as the effect of banking stability on the cost of credit for business over the long 
run, data for several other variables were collected.
3
 First, potential  macroeconomic indicators 
were collected i.e., UK equity returns, GDP, dollar exchange rates, interest rates, inflation rates, 
commodity prices  (proxied by wheat prices), net public debt, M3 money supply data, house 
price data, and bank lending data (see Appendix Table 1 for data sources).
4
 Second, in order to 
test the relationship between banking instability and the cost of credit, we use the UK corporate 
bond yield differential over government bonds as a proxy for the cost of credit intermediation or 
the premium borrowers must pay for credit. The yield spread between government and corporate 
debt is a commonly used measure of changes in the cost of credit during specific periods of 
banking instability (Bernanke, 1983; Hall, 2010; Bordo and Haubrich, 2010), and is recognised 
by the Bank of England as a proxy for the spread on bank borrowing for larger businesses (Butt 
and Pugh, 2014). In the UK, bank and bond markets have acted as good substitutes for loan 
capital. Historically, when banks were reluctant to advance money to businesses, the corporate 
bond market was an important alternative source of capital for companies of all sizes. Equally, 
banks stepped in to offer finance following the decline in the UK corporate bond market in the 
1970s (Coyle and Turner, 2013). Therefore, any increase in the cost of credit as the result of 
banking difficulties should also be reflected in the bond market. This is supported by the fact that 
the average annual corporate bond yield in our sample has a correlation of 90 per cent with the 
bank bill rate between 1870 and 2005, which is the rate on short-term debt instruments in which 
banks dealt.
5
    
                                                          
3
 We collect data on annual basis, as a number of the variables we use are not available at a greater frequency than 
annual for the full sample, including a number of hand collected variables.  
4
 While changes in bank capital ratios may be an important predictor of changes in bank instability, this is difficult to 
measure accurately over the long run due to the presence of unlimited liability, reserve liability, uncalled capital, and 
hidden reserves. Therefore, the capitalisation of banks is not a focus of this paper. 
5
 The bank bill rate refers to the prime bank bill rate for 1870-1982 from Capie and Webber (2010), and the eligible 
bank bill rate for 1983-2005, available from the Bank of England Interactive Database.  Banks ceased accepting 
eligible bank bills in 2005. 
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Our corporate bond dataset consists of hand-collected annual data, running from 1860, 
the first date for which we can find published data on UK corporate bonds, to 2010 (see 
Appendix Table 1 for data sources).
6
 Corporate bond yields are calculated from bonds issued by 
domestic UK companies.  A company was considered to be a UK company if its corporate 
headquarters and the main market where its securities traded were in the UK and its main 
activities were based in the UK.
7
  Our corporate bond dataset contains 49,804 observations. The 
yields on the government debt market are based on Consol prices for the period 1860 to 1955, 
and from 1955, a portfolio of high-coupon, long-dated bonds (see Appendix Table 1 for data 
sources). 
Several studies have specifically used the yield differential between Baa corporate bonds 
and U.S government bonds when constructing a measure of the cost of credit (e.g., Bernanke, 
1983; Mishkin, 2009; Bordo and Haubrich, 2010; Hall 2010). As there is no equivalent ‘Baa’ 
rating system for our UK sample, we use the average annual yield differential for our full sample 
of corporate bonds over UK government bonds. However, we also subdivide our corporate bond 
risk premium into two equal subsets for each year in the sample - one containing firms with 
above median yields and one containing firms with below median yields. This enables us to 
assess whether banking instability has a different effect on the credit-risk premium of firms in 
different risk grades. 
As can be seen for Table 1, which contains summary statistics of our key variables, bank 
returns are volatile, with a standard deviation of 20.32 per cent and a large range in annual 
returns. Several other variables appear similarly volatile. Money supply, commodity prices, 
                                                          
6
 All financial companies that issued bonds are excluded as these firms, for a large part of the sample period, were 
mainly financial trusts which issued bonds with the aim of investing the bulk of the proceeds in the equities and 
bonds of foreign companies (Jefferys 1977, p.262). 
7
 The criteria used to determine whether a firm was based in the UK or overseas was based on (a) the section in 
which it appears in the relevant stock-exchange yearbook (e.g., Foreign Railways), (b) the company’s name (e.g., 
New Zealand and Australia Land Co. Ltd.), or (c) if the company had a head office in a foreign country of operation 
as well as one in the UK.  This information was obtained from a combination of the Investor’s Monthly Manual 
(1864-1930); Burdett’s Official Intelligence (1882-98), the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (1899-1933), and 
the Stock Exchange Yearbook (1934-2010). 
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public debt growth, and equity returns all have standard deviations of 13 per cent or greater. 
Notably, the volatilities of each of the three risk premium variables are similar over the full 
sample period.  
In order to test our hypotheses, multiple-dimension vector autoregression (VAR) models 
and Granger causality tests are used in order to determine if there is a statistically significant 
relationship between macroeconomic variables and banking instability and between banking 
instability and the credit-risk premium. As the variables concerned may simultaneously influence 
one another over the sample period and the exact structure of the underlying relationship of the 
multiple time series is unknown, VAR models are used to account for the dynamics of all 
variables. The multivariate VAR model is of the form: 
Yt = β0 + β1Yt-1 +…..+ βmYt-m  = ut        (1) 
where Yt is a vector of all the macroeconomic and banking stability variables included in the 
system, β0 is a vector of constants, β1…β m are matrices of coefficients of all the lagged variables, 
m represents the number of lags of each variable, and ui is a set of error terms. The exact 
specification of the VAR model is discussed in greater detail in sections 5 and 6. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
4. British Banking Stability Over the Long Run 
4.1 Nineteenth-century crises 
From Figs. 1, 2 and 3, which contain our series of British bank returns and also highlight 
episodes defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) as banking crises, we see that several years in 
which crises are said to have taken place during the nineteenth century show negative stock 
returns. In particular, the crises in 1847, 1857, 1866 and 1878 are associated with negative 
returns. However, as can be seen from Table 2, relative to the overall market, the fall in bank 
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stocks during these four episodes were not particularly severe and very few bank stocks lost more 
than 20 per cent of their value.  Notably, the banking crises in 1836-9 and 1890 are not 
associated with negative returns or volatility in the market for bank shares.  
<FIGS. 1, 2, 3 & TABLE 2 HERE> 
One possible reason as to why we do not find that these nineteenth-century crises are 
associated with large falls in bank stocks is that a lot of commercial banking was still performed 
by small private banks, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, the 
failure rate of private banks was never higher than 2.3 per cent during any of these crises (Turner, 
2014, p. 53).  Another possible reason is that there were not systemic problems during this era; 
rather the banking problems experienced in the nineteenth century were more idiosyncratic.  
Below we provide some context for each crisis which illustrates this point. 
The banking problems of 1836-9 were chiefly manifested in the prominent failures of the 
Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland and Northern and Central Bank of England. Unlike 
most of their counterparts, these two banks had expanded rapidly (particularly their branch 
network) following their establishment in 1834. They were also both riddled with unique 
governance problems.  
During the 1847 crisis, several medium-sized banks in the north-east of England failed 
and several other English banks temporarily suspended payments. The 1847 crisis was in reality 
a commercial crisis accompanied by a money-market crisis, which was precipitated by the fear 
that the newly-established Bank Charter Act curtailed the ability of the Bank of England to act as 
a lender of last resort.     
Following the arrival of news from the U.S. in the autumn of 1857 that railroad securities 
had fallen substantially and that there were numerous bank suspensions on the Atlantic coast, 
many British firms involved in trading with the U.S. failed, which placed pressure on their banks. 
Three important banks failed in this crisis – Liverpool Borough Bank, Western Bank of Scotland, 
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and the Northumberland and Durham District Bank. Each of these three failures was 
idiosyncratic, with aggressive risk-taking, long-term accumulation (and hiding) of bad debts, and 
concentrated lending (Turner, 2014, pp. 77-78). 
The 1866 crisis was largely precipitated by the failure of Overend, Gurney and Company, 
a discount house, which after accumulating large (but hidden) bad debts from the late 1850s 
onwards had converted to a limited-liability public company in 1865.  Several small banks as 
well as the Birmingham Banking Company, a large bank which was the most senior bank in the 
West Midlands, failed following the Overend Gurney collapse. In each of these cases of failure, 
there was clear mismanagement and in several instances there was concentrated lending, insider 
lending, and fraudulent accounting (Turner, 2014, pp.82-4).      
The central event of the 1878 crisis was the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank – 
Glasgow’s premier bank, which had the third largest branch network in the UK. The £5 million 
deficit between its assets and liabilities was met by calls on its shareholders, the majority of 
whom were bankrupted by the action (Acheson and Turner, 2008).  The City of Glasgow Bank 
had a very risky asset management strategy, concentrated loan portfolio, and directors who had 
engaged in fraud (for which several of them were subsequently incarcerated). Other banks, and in 
particular the Bank of England, had never trusted this bank (Clapham, 1944, vol. 2, p.309; Rait, 
1930). The other major bank to fail in this crisis was the West of England and South Wales 
District Bank, and similar to the City of Glasgow Bank, it had concentrated loans, falsified 
accounts, and fraudulent attempts were made to conceal the bank’s real position from its 
shareholders (Turner, 2014, p. 87). 
At the time of its failure in 1890, Barings Brother and Co. was one of the most powerful 
merchant banks in Europe. During the 1880s, it had invested heavily in the emerging economies 
of Argentina and Uruguay. However, economic difficulties in these countries resulted in Barings 
suffering such large losses that it required a guarantee fund co-ordinated by the Bank of England 
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and funded by major commercial banks to prevent its collapse. It is entirely possible that this 
action taken by the Bank of England, which was fully supported by the UK Treasury, prevented 
commercial banks from failing or their stock prices from falling (Collins and Baker, 2003, p.99). 
However, on closer inspection of Fig. 3, we do not see a fall in bank stocks in the month or 
months before the Bank of England’s support arrangement was announced.        
4.2 Twentieth-century crises 
When we move into the twentieth century, we observe from Figs. 1, 2 and 3 that bank stocks 
became more volatile in the twentieth century compared to the nineteenth century, particularly in 
the second half of the twentieth century. This is consistent with studies indicating that financial 
instability has increased in the post Bretton Woods era (Bordo et al., 2001).  
Notably, although bank stocks fell by nearly 25 per cent during the Great Depression 
(Fig. 1), they fell by less than the overall stock market. This is consistent with the view that 
Britain did not experience a banking crisis during this period (Grossman, 1994; Capie and Wood, 
2012, p. 333).  
Of the five twentieth-century crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), only 1914 
and 1974 are associated with negative returns on bank stocks. The breakdown of European 
capital markets and the foreign-exchange crisis in the summer of 1914 did not cause major 
instability in the banking sector as indicated by Fig. 1 and Table 2.  Although capital markets 
were closed from July 1914 through the rest of 1914, bank stocks did not decline when the 
market reopened. However, the extension of the usual August Bank Holiday in 1914 by four days 
plus the issue of Treasury notes contributed to the easing of liquidity pressures faced by banks 
following the breakdown of the European markets (Sayers, 1976, Vol. 1, pp.74-6). 
The negative returns on bank stocks in 1974 clearly stand out in Fig. 1. Secondary banks, 
which had raised funds on the newly-liberalised money markets and advanced them in the form 
of property and consumer finance loans, got into difficulties in late 1973 (Capie, 2010, pp.524-
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86; Reid, 1982). Commercial banks, coordinated by the Bank of England, provided liquidity 
support, and, as a result, the difficulties almost passed unnoticed (Reid, 1982, p. 200). Fig. 1 
shows significant volatility during this period with large negative returns of -27.79 per cent in 
1973 and -62.85 per cent in 1974, indicating much greater instability than at any earlier stage in 
the sample. However, the large fall in bank stocks is quickly followed by a huge rebound in 
returns the following year (Fig. 1). While this may reflect the difficulties faced by the secondary 
banks in the UK, this pattern is also found in the overall equity market during this period, 
suggesting that bank shares were really influenced by other factors, including the 1973 Oil Crisis 
and extremely high inflation. When the returns of the overall equity market are taken into 
account, the excess returns on bank stocks are only -8.0 per cent (Table 2).  
As can be seen from Fig. 1 and Table 2, there is little evidence of negative returns in 
1984, 1991 and 1995.  In fact, banks stocks outperform the overall stock market in each of these 
years. 1984 is classified as a banking crisis by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) because of the failure 
of Johnson Matthey Bankers, a bullion dealer which had expanded into lending in the early 
1980s.  This bullion dealer was taken over by the Bank of England and the Bank co-ordinated a 
private-sector indemnity fund. These actions may have prevented a fall in bank stocks, but from 
Fig. 3, we see that in the month before the Bank’s action, bank stock prices actually rose. The 
1991 crisis is designated as such by Reinhart and Rogoff due to the collapse of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International, an international bank with operational headquarters in 
London. The 1995 crisis is designated as such following the collapse of Barings Brothers after 
one of its traders amassed huge losses on Nikkei 225 Index futures.  However, neither of these 
failures appear to have had a negative effect on the commercial banking system.      
4.3 The twenty-first-century crisis 
As can be clearly seen from Fig. 1 and Table 2, the collapse of the banking system in 2007-8 is 
of a totally different order of magnitude than all previous crises. In terms of negative returns, this 
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crisis is unparalleled, with returns of -26.87 per cent and -76.50 per cent in 2007 and 2008 
respectively. In total, six of the nine big British banks were insolvent, with over half of the 
domestic banking system in terms of total assets requiring a bailout. The scale of the 2007-8 
instability is apparent in Table 2, with the stock of the worst performing bank in either year 
falling by more than 90 per cent, far beyond any fall in any other year over the 181-year sample 
period. Indeed, the fall in bank stock prices was only arrested by the extraordinary support 
measures taken by the Bank of England and UK Treasury. Consequently, we can truly say of the 
2007-8 crisis that ‘this time is different’!  
 
4.4 Summary 
Several of the banking crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) do not manifest 
themselves in our data. This arises because of the definition used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), 
which means that the failure of one financial institution constitutes a crisis. Quite clearly, the 
idiosyncratic failures of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, Barings in 1890, Johnson Matthey 
Bankers in 1984, BCCI in 1991, and Barings in 1995 were not viewed as banking crises by 
contemporaries and therefore do no manifest themselves in our data. This demonstrates the 
limitations of the qualitative definition of banking crises used in many studies of banking crises.  
 
5. Leading Indicators of Banking Instability  
In this section, we examine macroeconomic variables to see if they prove to be leading predictors 
of UK banking instability over the long run. Panel A of Table 3 presents changes in these 
variables in the years before, during and after the twelve UK banking crises which have been 
documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Five things are worthy of note.  First, there are on 
average large positive real equity returns two years before crises followed by large negative 
returns the year of banking crises. Second, real interest rates and inflation are higher than their 
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historical averages in the two years before these crises, as is real GDP growth, which shows an 
acceleration of economic activity in the year before crises. Third, broad money supply growth is 
also consistently higher than the sample average in the years leading up to banking crises. Fourth, 
changes in wheat prices, a proxy for commodities, are on average negative two years before a 
banking crisis; however, price growth outstrips its historical average by many times in the year 
before and the year of these crises.  Fifth, bank lending and house price growth show large above 
average increases in the years leading up to banking crises, which would support the view that 
significant credit growth and house price growth fuelled by easy credit may trigger financial 
instability. Panel B of Table 3 presents figures for the most significant individual periods of 
banking instability in our sample, namely those events in which 10 per cent or more of all banks 
lost more than 20 per cent of their market value. Several of the trends visible in Panel A are again 
evident in individual nineteenth and twentieth century crises, highlighting similarities in the 
origin and evolution of banking instability. However, there are also interesting differences in 
variable changes around the crises in Panel B. Specifically, in the years before the 1878 crisis, 
which had its origins in an idiosyncratic bank collapse, real interest rates are high and lending 
growth, inflation and real equity returns are relatively low. It is also interesting to note that, on 
average, GDP growth is positive in the years following crises documented by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) (Panel A). However, for the four most severe crises (see Panel B), GDP growth is 
negative in the year following the crisis.  
< TABLE 3 HERE> 
While Table 3 highlights these relationships during specific periods of banking crises, we 
now turn to examine if there is a statistically significant relationship between these variables and 
banking instability over the long run using our full sample. Specifically, multiple dimension 
VAR models and Granger causality tests are used in order to determine if there is any statistically 
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significant relationship between various macroeconomic variables and the level of British 
banking instability.  
Prior to the analysis of the linkages between macroeconomic variables and financial 
instability, the specification of the functional form of the system, such as lag order was 
determined. Various lag order selection criteria tests, including the Akaike, Schwarz, and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion, indicate the optimum lag length to be two. In addition, 
Dickey-Fuller tests were used to test for stationarity.  All variables, with the exception of 
exchange rates, were stationary; the exchange rate variable was therefore transformed to ensure 
stationarity. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in some variables, the 
model is run using heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. 
Tests are carried out for three main periods. First, tests are run for 1860-2010, the period 
for which we have bank lending and risk premium data. Second, the full dataset of bank share 
prices from 1835-2010 is tested.
8
 Third, tests are also run on the period for which we have UK 
house-price data i.e., 1901-2010. The absolute value of average bank returns, a non-parametric 
measure of volatility, is used as the baseline measure of banking instability. These tests are rerun 
using drawdown of bank returns, measured by the change in an index of bank returns from its 
previous historical peak, nominal bank returns, and volatility of bank returns, measured by the 
non-overlapping annual standard deviation of average monthly returns. 
The results of Granger causality tests for our baseline model are shown in Panel A of 
Table 4. For this section, we only report Granger causality results following the VAR which 
depict the relationship between all variable lags and our variable of interest, banking instability, 
for our three time periods (the full matrices of Granger causality results following all VAR 
models are reported in the Appendix Tables). These tests examine the null hypothesis that the 
lags of all the variables included in each model (Columns 3-14) do not Granger cause changes in 
                                                          
8
 The years 1830-34 are dropped due to volatility caused by too few observations. 
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the variable in Column 2. From the first row of Panel A Table 4, we can reject the null 
hypothesis for several indicators. It appears that indicators which consistently Granger cause 
changes in UK banking stability from 1860-2010 are; real equity return growth, bank lending 
growth, money supply growth, real rates of interest, inflation, and net public debt growth. Lags 
of lending, interest rates, and inflation are significant at the one per cent level and equity returns, 
money supply, and public debt are significant at the five per cent level. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
Row 2 of Panel A Table 4 shows the results for the full sample period (1835-2010).  
These results confirm that real equity returns, money supply, real rates of interest, and inflation 
are significant predictors of changes in UK banking stability over the long-run. Lags of interest 
rates and inflation are again significant at the one per cent level.  
The above results are consistent with our predictions and with findings from most 
indicator models of financial crisis in the extant literature. Exchange rates do not appear to 
explain changes in banking stability during this period in any test, supporting the findings of 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000). Our findings also suggest that commodity prices (proxied by 
wheat prices) and output also do not significantly explain changes in banking stability.  
The final row of Panel A Table 4 presents the results for the period 1901-2010. Granger 
causality tests are largely consistent with the results from the previous two periods. Real interest 
rates and inflation again prove to be indicators of changes in banking instability. There is also 
further evidence that changes in bank lending growth, real equity returns, money supply growth 
and net public debt growth are significant predictors of instability. It appears that house price 
growth is not a significant predictor of banking instability during this sample period. While 
house price bubbles have been associated with banking instability in the recent past, this may not 
have always been the case. Notably, there have been several periods of strong house price growth 
during the sample period, which were not associated with banking instability.  
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Several of these results are robust across alternative measures of banking instability. 
Panel B of Table 4 includes results of Granger causality tests when the above specifications are 
rerun, replacing absolute bank returns with drawdown, nominal bank returns and standard 
deviation of bank returns as the measure of instability. Using drawdown of bank returns as a 
measure of instability, results suggests that real equity returns, lending growth, inflation and real 
rates of interest are significant indicators of changes in banking instability over the long-run, 
which is consistent with the results above.  
 Using nominal bank returns and standard deviation of bank returns as measures of 
instability also show that lags of real interest rates, inflation, and bank lending growth Granger 
cause changes in bank instability. However, real equity returns is not a significant predictor of 
banking instability at the 10 per cent level. Interestingly, for the standard deviation of bank 
returns, the addition of house prices indicates that they have explanatory power for changes in 
bank share price volatility at the 10 per cent level.  
The correlation matrix between VAR variable residuals, which captures contemporaneous 
relationships between variables, is presented in Table 5. Notably, there is a positive correlation 
between our banking instability variable and the risk premium, real equity market returns, 
lending growth and inflation, all of which are statistically significant. There is also a negative 
correlation with the real interest rate, significant at the five per cent level, which could be 
attributed to increased bank earnings over the short run, following interest rate rises. 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
Fig. 4 displays the impulse responses of banking instability to a one standard error shock 
to each indicator variable, with 90 per cent confidence intervals. These functions give a clearer 
picture of the direction of the relationship between variables. From Fig. 4, we see that instability 
rises in response to a positive shock to money supply and inflation, with the peak response 
occurring after one to two years. A shock to bank lending growth is also associated with 
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increased instability. However, instability decreases one year after a positive shock to real equity 
returns and a positive shock to real interest rates only slightly increases instability after one year. 
In order to determine how much the ordering of our variables in the VAR matters, Fig. 5 uses the 
reverse of the ordering used in Fig. 4. The results in Fig. 5 are largely similar to those in Fig. 4, 
with the main difference being the response of banking instability to a shock to real interest rates 
and inflation, with the effect of inflation being decreased and the effect of real interest rates 
becoming more pronounced. In this analysis, inflation is allowed to affect interest rates 
contemporaneously, where the reverse was true in Fig. 4. A positive shock to the real interest rate 
variable increases banking instability sharply in the first year in this ordering, while a positive 
shock to inflation results in a small increase in instability, which disappears after two years.    
<FIGS. 4 & 5 HERE> 
 The question arises to how the regulatory environment and the safety net affect bank 
behaviour in a particular macroeconomic environment. For example, low interest rates and high 
equity returns may not stimulate a credit expansion if it is constrained by regulation. On the other 
hand, the presence of a safety net may incentivise banks to expand credit and increase the risk of 
their portfolio. Interestingly, in the case of the UK, there were substantial restraints on credit 
from World War II until the early 1970s (Turner, 2014, pp.181-6). This corresponds to a very 
stable period in British banking. Correspondingly, the credit growth prior to 2008, occurred in a 
very lax regulatory environment with a substantial safety net. The institutional setting will 
therefore also be an important determinant of how banks behave and whether credit grows. 
However, over the long-run, the key results in this section suggest that credit growth, equity 
returns, inflation and real rates of interest are important leading indicators of banking instability. 
   
6. Banking Instability and Credit  
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In this section, we evaluate whether banking instability in the UK is associated with an increase 
in the credit-risk premium. The average yield spread of UK corporate bonds over long-dated 
government bonds is used as a measure of the credit risk premium and a proxy for the cost of 
credit intermediation (Fig. 6).  
<FIG. 6 HERE> 
As not all crises documented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) appear to be associated with 
significant instability in the banking sector, we begin by analysing changes in the corporate bond 
risk premium in two specific subsamples of banking instability: (1) all periods highlighted as 
banking crises in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and (2) four individual periods of the most severe 
instability, which are defined as events in which 10 per cent or more of all banks lost greater than 
20 per cent of their market value.  
Panel A of Table 6 reports average values of bank returns and our risk premium variables 
in the two years before and after all UK banking crisis documented by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) for the period 1830-2010. We can see that on average, bank returns fall sharply in the year 
of these episodes, falling 9.24 per cent. Furthermore, there is a significant increase in the 
corporate bond risk premium during these episodes, suggesting a strong relationship between 
banking instability and higher credit costs for companies. The yield differential increases 
significantly, with an average increase of over 40 per cent from year t-1 to t0. When we limit the 
sample to just the higher risk firms, which are more likely to be small, the increase in the cost of 
credit is much greater in absolute terms. The risk premium of the lower risk firms increases to a 
much smaller degree, on average, during banking difficulties. From Panel A, it is also apparent 
that for the two years following the episode, yield spreads remain persistently higher, on average, 
for the high-risk firms than in the years immediately before the crisis. 
 <TABLE 6 HERE>  
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This evidence may corroborate the view that it is the smallest borrowers that are 
disproportionally hit by severe instability (Bernanke 1983, pp. 264-265; Calomiris and Mason, 
2003; Frederiksen 1931, p.131). While these risk premium changes undoubtedly reflect normal 
changes in default risk across the business cycle, the relationship between large increases in this 
risk premium during significant banking difficulties is clear.  
Panel B of Table 6 analyses the four most severe periods of instability in our sample 
individually in order to ascertain whether these events evolve similarly, or if there is variation in 
how the cost of credit reacts. Panel B shows that across all periods, the corporate bond risk 
premium increases for the higher risk sample; however the increases are much more severe 
during the most recent crises. The risk premium for lower risk firms increases to a much lesser 
extent during these events. Interestingly, during the 1974 banking instability, while we see large 
increases in the risk premium of our higher risk firms, the premium of the lower risk sample 
decreases significantly, indicating a ‘flight to quality’. This is then reversed, to a degree, as the 
premium for higher risk firms falls in the years following 1974.  
If we look specifically at changes in the yield differential around the recent 2007-8 
banking crisis, we can see that this is by far the most severe episode of banking instability in our 
sample. First, the decline in bank returns is the largest of any sub-sample. From 2006 to 2008, 
the average corporate bond risk premium in our sample increased from 0.77 per cent to 2.76 per 
cent. This represents an increase of 258 per cent in the risk premium firms had to pay to raise 
money on the bond market in the UK. This is by far the largest annual increase throughout the 
entire sample period. The British government and the Bank of England claimed to have opened 
channels of credit to individuals and small businesses affected by this banking crisis. Panel B 
indicates that these policies may have been successful in that the average cost of credit to all 
businesses had returned to a more normal level by 2009.  
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The results in Table 6 support the view that significant banking instability is accompanied 
by large increases in the cost of credit to businesses, and it is the riskiest/smallest firms which 
suffer the most and/or longest. In the remainder of this section, we examine if there is a 
statistically significant link between overall banking instability and the corporate bond risk 
premium. In order to do this, we present further results from the earlier VAR models and 
Granger causality tests, now focusing on how lags of all variables in the system affect the risk 
premium variable, with additional results focusing on our subsamples of low-risk firms and high-
risk firms (Table 7).  
The null hypothesis for these tests is that the lags of variables in Columns 3-12 of Table 7 
have no significant effect on the variable in the ‘Dependent Variable’ column. From Row 1 of 
Panel A, we see that there is strong evidence that instability in the banking sector Granger causes 
changes in the corporate bond risk premium at around the one to two per cent significance level 
(Column 3). This result adds weight to the belief that banking instability is associated with a 
breakdown in the ability of markets to channel funds from lenders to borrowers. Banking 
instability is also a predictor of changes in the risk premium at the one per cent significance level 
for both risk premium sub-groups.   
<TABLE 7 HERE> 
It is interesting to note that lags of the returns on the equity market have significant 
predictive power for the credit-risk premium at the one per cent level for low-risk firms (Row 3, 
Panel A). This would suggest that the general condition of corporations in the market plays a 
significant role in explaining the cost of credit premium that these firms face over the long run, 
as one would expect. However, this effect is not present for the most risky subset of firms (Row 
2, Panel A), which may suggest that changes in the risk premium of this subset are actually less 
related to the past condition of corporations. Similar results are evident in Panel B which presents 
results using alternative measures of instability. This, again, may support the belief that it is the 
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smallest borrowers that are disproportionally affected by banking instability, with projects which 
in normal times would be funded, frozen from credit markets due to banking difficulties 
(Bernanke 1983, pp. 264-5).  
While banking instability itself is consistently a significant predictor of changes in GDP 
(Appendix Table 2), we do not find evidence of significance at the 10 per cent level that changes 
in lags of the risk premium Granger cause direct changes in real GDP growth over the full 
sample. This may be because such a link is only significant during periods of extreme instability 
and large increases in the risk premium. An alternative explanation may be that changes in the 
risk premium affects GDP through a transmission mechanism via changes in the equity market, 
as there is a significant relationship running from risk premium to equity returns and equity 
returns to GDP in this model (Appendix Table 2). It also appears that any direct effect decreases 
further as we move to the more risky subset of firms, suggesting an importance of large (less 
risky firms) for economic growth.  
There is also evidence in Appendix Table 2 that banking instability Granger causes 
changes in the money supply in the UK over the long run. In addition, lags of money supply have 
consistent predictive power for output changes, as would be suggested by the monetary 
transmission mechanism. This finding offers some support to the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 




This paper uses 181 years of bank share prices to develop a new measure of British banking 
instability over the long run. We find that the British banking system has faced several episodes 
of instability throughout this period. However, our evidence suggests that banking instability in 
the UK has grown more severe in the final quarter of the twentieth century, culminating in by far 
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the largest banking crisis in our sample in 2007-8. The ultimate roots of the 2007-8 banking 
difficulties, as with previous periods of banking instability, are likely to be found in regulatory 
failures and in the political economy of banking (Rajan, 2010; Calomiris and Haber, 2014; 
Turner, 2014). While macroeconomic conditions may not have been the main or ultimate cause, 
they may have played a role in triggering or exacerbating banking difficulties.     
In order to investigate potential macroeconomic causes of banking instability, we use a 
series of vector autoregressions and our unique dataset to establish which variables consistently 
act as significant indicators of instability over the long run. We find that interest rates, inflation, 
bank lending growth, and equity prices routinely act as indicators of changes to overall banking 
instability in the UK over the last two centuries. This suggests that stability of these factors 
should be an important policy goal. Finally, in terms of consequences of banking instability, we 
find long-run evidence that banking instability consistently acts as a significant predictor of 
changes in the credit-risk premium that all businesses face, particularly small firms.  This implies 
that the policy response during crises should be designed with this in mind.  More fundamentally, 
however, given these costs of banking instability to small firms and the economy at large, an 
appropriate regulatory structure needs to be devised which lessens the probability of  future 
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Average Bank  
Returns (%) 
5.32 2.60 20.32 -76.50 154.64 34.81 181 
Absolute Bank  
Returns (%) 
11.92 6.24 17.26 0.01 154.64 n/a 181 
Annual SD of  
Bank Returns (%) 
2.99 1.70 3.09 0.30 18.86 n/a 181 
Corporate Bond  
Risk Premium (%) 
0.94 1.07 0.96 -2.28 2.86 12.58 151 
Drawdown (%) -3.82 -2.19 19.78 -82.81 51.76 58.56 181 
High Risk 
Premium 1/2 (%) 
1.81 1.60 0.82 0.19 4.29 0.00 151 
Low Risk 
 Premium 1/2 (%) 
0.08 0.60 1.34 -5.14 1.49 23.18 151 
Real Interest (%) 1.70 2.28 5.31 -20.83 18.43 24.86 181 
GDP Growth 
(Nominal, %) 
4.73 5.02 6.10 -17.87 26.27 18.33 180 
GDP Growth 
 (Real, %) 
2.00 2.34 2.93 -9.80 9.92 18.89 180 
M3 Money Supply  
Growth (%) 
8.89 4.90 14.94 -7.54 140.82 13.07 176 
Inflation (%) 2.76 1.80 6.05 -14.00 25.20 27.62 181 
Equity Returns 
(Nominal, %) 
10.86 10.16 17.73 -48.80 145.60 20.44 181 
Equity Returns 
 (Real, %) 
8.10 7.60 18.04 -64.80 121.40 26.52 181 
Wheat Price Growth 
(%) 
2.90 1.52 19.22 -34.86 100.00 44.75 181 
Exchange Rate 3.98 4.79 1.50 1.30 9.97 n/a 181 
Public Net Debt 
Growth (%) 
4.47 0.00 13.06 -10.96 95.37 29.83 181 
House Price Growth 
(%) 
5.65 3.45 7.63 -15.79 34.83 10.00 110 
Bank Lending Growth 
(%) 
7.36 5.00 10.73 -14.00 65.00 19.21 151 
Notes: The corporate bond risk premium is the excess of current yield on debentures over and 
above Consols or high-coupon, long-dated government bonds.  The corporate bond risk premium 
over government bonds is further categorised into two subsets: High Risk Premium 1/2 (highest 










   Per cent of banks to lose 10-50%+ of value 
Total 
banks 
















       
  
 
1836 -3.96 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14 Provincial Bank -6.67 
1837 -1.32 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16 Provincial Bank -4.76 
1838 3.96 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17 Royal Bank of Scotland -0.62 
1839 -0.16 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 21 London Joint Stock Bank -9.26 
1847 3.55 50% 9% 0% 0% 0% 22 North of Scotland -22.54 
1857 -1.90 35% 4% 4% 0% 0% 23 Glasgow Union / Union Bank -30.58 
1866 -4.53 27% 10% 7% 0% 0% 30 
Alliance of London & 
Liverpool 
-38.14 
1878 -6.13 39% 18% 2% 1% 0% 106 Clydesdale -41.24 
1890 0.88 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97 Yorkshire Banking Company -38.82 
1914 7.28 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 45 Union of London & Smiths  -6.02 
1974 -8.00 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 7 Nat. West. Bank -69.85 
1984 25.70 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7 Midland -16.78 
1991 13.33 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7 Barclays -3.97 
1995 22.83 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7 Nat. West. Bank 28.79 
2007-8 
         
2007 -39.93 88% 75% 38% 38% 0% 8 Northern Rock -92.87 
2008 -35.83 100% 100% 80% 80% 80% 5 HBOS -90.36 
Notes: As our focus is the state of the overall banking sector in any given period, and we do not have share price 
data for several of the banks that failed during our sample period, which is further complicated by unlimited liability 
and nationalisation, failed/nationalised banks are removed from sample at the point of failure/nationalisation and not 
included as 100% loss.  However, including 100% losses for failed/nationalised banks in our sample only makes the 
decline in 2007-8 more standout due to the points mentioned above and due to the large difference in the number of 
banks in operation across the sample. Dates included are those highlighted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) as years 












































Panel A: All Documented UK Banking Crises, 1830-2010      
-2 16.83 2.99 14.48 1.90 2.60 3.24 15.4 -1.20 4.08 14.9 7.88 
-1 1.29 3.62 1.98 1.54 3.64 3.66 19.74 12.69 3.85 9.75 11.6 
0 -8.12 3.38 -3.98 1.77 0.68 3.70 9.36 10.10 3.63 8.05 5.33 
1 17.92 11.49 22.82 2.52 1.19 2.93 13.23 2.18 3.69 3.19 3.19 
2 10.08 14.04 11.17 1.47 2.80 3.81 9.03 2.84 3.66 5.51 7.52 
Panel B: Significant UK Banking Instability: 1866, 1878, 1974, 2007-8       
-2 12.39 -1.25 15.29 4.08 1.68 -0.90 13.86 -10.20 9.97 42.17 
 
-1 -0.81 0.00 9.26 2.30 4.23 0.90 12.46 4.08 7.69 2.25 
 
1866 -7.96 -1.27 -3.52 -3.24 1.15 6.50 15.45 19.33 6.88 2.27 
 
1 -8.93 0.00 6.15 -3.02 -0.94 6.10 2.30 29.11 6.75 -4.75 
 
2 -0.139 -3.846 21.25 4.76 3.049 -1.70 -0.741 -1.06 6.83 4.65 
 
            
-2 1.25 1.39 6.06 3.32 0.72 -0.30 0.48 2.21 5.42 1.05 
 
-1 4.62 0.00 6.72 3.71 0.63 -0.70 -2.88 22.88 5.08 0.77 
 
1878 -9.67 0.00 -0.79 5.21 0.33 -2.20 -3.45 -18.19 4.89 -2.16 
 
1 -4.11 1.37 28.29 7.34 -1.90 -4.40 -3.92 -5.6 4.85 -12.01 
 
2 3.66 0.00 8.16 -0.09 7.07 3.00 0.18 1.19 4.84 0.47 
 
            
-2 48.98 7.18 11.50 1.00 3.66 7.10 23.93 18.88 2.50 28.56 30.93 
-1 -27.79 2.90 -33.50 0.54 7.20 9.20 26.88 72.97 2.45 28.32 34.83 
1974 -62.85 9.71 -64.8 -2.66 -1.31 16.00 18.26 21.88 2.34 14.95 10.54 
1 154.64 14.68 121.4 -11.2 -0.62 24.20 9.51 -5.13 2.22 4.49 7.25 
2 -17.99 21.96 -13.6 -3.46 2.63 16.50 10.48 29.39 1.80 16.93 7.78 
            
-2 5.14 10.76 19.96 2.99 2.17 1.34 12.20 4.50 1.82 9.04 5.83 
-1 16.10 9.20 14.35 2.12 2.85 2.05 13.90 29.56 1.84 13.02 7.37 
2007 -26.87 7.99 2.77 2.23 2.56 2.33 13.40 76.63 2.00 12.92 9.08 
2008 -76.5 5.00 -33.42 2.34 0.55 2.32 10.10 -32.73 1.85 13.10 1.95 
1 7.83 17.50 28.19 0.84 -4.92 3.61 5.40 -1.12 1.57 2.81 -0.75 
2 9.94 23.12 9.00 2.300 1.91 2.17 -1.40 53.53 1.55 -1.17 11.31 
Full sample average 
        
 
5.38 4.47 8.10 1.70 2.00 2.76 8.89 2.90 3.98 7.36 5.65 
Notes: Panel A includes all banking crises discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Panel B includes the years 1866, 
1878, 1974 and 2007-8; periods in which 10 per cent or more of all banks lost more than 20 per cent of their market 
value (see Table 2). *Bank lending growth is from 1860 onwards and house price growth is from 1901 onwards. 














































(P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Panel A: Absolute returns 
            
1860-2010 Bank Instability 0.047 0.581 0.023 0.010 0.899 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.298 0.029 0.146 
 




0.832 0.083 0.009 0.000 0.945 0.192 0.240 
 
1901-2010 Bank Instability 0.039 0.845 0.035 0.017 0.732 0.088 0.009 0.000 0.754 0.036 0.149 0.168 
              
Panel B: Drawdown 
            
1860-2010 Bank Instability 0.001 0.770 0.083 0.016 0.638 0.919 0.008 0.072 0.043 0.681 0.376 
 




0.639 0.160 0.049 0.069 0.266 0.914 0.382 
 
1901-2010 Bank Instability 0.006 0.651 0.066 0.241 0.241 0.729 0.000 0.015 0.197 0.621 0.360 0.623 
              Standard deviation of returns 
           
1860-2010 Bank Instability 0.000 0.100 0.470 0.039 0.574 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.016 0.336 0.086 
 




0.512 0.752 0.031 0.000 0.174 0.093 0.063 
 
1901-2010 Bank Instability 0.000 0.335 0.475 0.152 0.451 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.695 0.222 0.098 0.094 
              Nominal returns 
            
1860-2010 Bank Instability 0.473 0.196 0.167 0.017 0.659 0.888 0.000 0.001 0.075 0.139 0.151 
 




0.874 0.358 0.000 0.001 0.174 0.494 0.253 
 
1901-2010 Bank Instability 0.567 0.043 0.146 0.049 0.416 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.645 0.124 0.086 0.556 
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests following a vector autoregression. Only the results relevant to the banking instability variable are presented 









Table 5.  











































Bank Instability 1.000 
          
Risk Premium 0.142* 1.000 
         
Equity returns (real, %) 0.362*** -0.102 1.000 
        
Bank lending growth (%) 0.153* -0.173** 0.130 1.000 
       
GDP growth (real, %) 0.074 -0.049 0.162** 0.053 1.000 
      
Money supply growth (%) 0.060 -0.067 0.048 0.171** 0.350*** 1.000 
     
Inflation (%) 0.153* -0.015 -0.157* -0.002 0.167** 0.070 1.000 
    
Interest rate   (real, %) -0.177** -0.043 0.075 0.008 -0.192** -0.068 -0.990*** 1.000 
   
Exchange Rate -0.026 -0.083 0.078 0.392*** 0.008 0.094 -0.188** 0.191** 1.000 
  
Public net debt growth (%) -0.068 -0.108 -0.080 -0.080 0.056 0.177** 0.345*** -0.327*** -0.007 1.000 
 








Corporate bond  
risk premium (%) 
High risk  
premium 1/2 (%) 
Low risk  
premium 1/2 (%) 
Panel A: All Documented UK Banking Crises, 1860-2010 
 
-2 16.01 0.74 1.67 -0.19 
-1 0.86 0.57 1.57 -0.44 
0 -9.24 0.80 1.96 -0.34 
1 22.08 0.65 1.76 -0.45 
2 12.02 0.78 1.90 -0.34 
Panel B: Significant UK Banking Instability: 1866, 1878, 1974, 2007-8  
-2 12.39 0.97 1.18 0.75 
-1 -0.81 0.92 1.14 0.71 
1866 -7.96 1.14 1.44 0.85 
1 -8.93 1.30 1.63 0.98 
2 -0.139 1.18 1.47 0.90 
     
-2 1.25 0.75 0.86 0.63 
-1 4.62 0.92 1.11 0.72 
1878 -9.67 0.93 1.13 0.73 
1 -4.11 0.95 1.19 0.73 
2 3.66 0.84 1.10 0.58 
     
-2 48.98 -0.32 0.97 -1.60 
-1 -27.79 -0.67 1.17 -2.51 
1974 -62.85 -1.51 2.11 -5.14 
1 154.64 -2.06 0.81 -4.91 
2 -17.99 -1.82 0.85 -4.50 
     
-2 5.14 0.66 1.30 0.02 
-1 16.10 0.77 1.51 0.04 
2007 -26.87 0.96 1.70 0.22 
2008 -76.5 2.76 4.20 1.36 
1 7.83 0.67 1.70 -0.36 
2 9.94 0.19 1.35 -0.96 
Notes: Panel A includes all banking crises discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Panel B includes the 
years 1866, 1878, 1974 and 2007-8; periods in which 10 per cent or more of all banks lost more than 20 per 
cent of their market value (see Table 2). The corporate bond risk premium over government bonds is further 
categorised into two subsets of High risk premium 1/2 (highest 50% of yields) and Low risk premium 1/2 
(lowest 50% of yields). 















































(P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Panel A: Absolute returns 
            
Risk Premium (Full Sample) Risk Premium 0.018 0.000 0.104 0.340 0.345 0.556 0.242 0.249 0.639 0.540 0.137 
Risk Premium (High Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.007 0.004 0.350 0.842 0.636 0.825 0.465 0.091 0.813 0.531 0.048 
Risk Premium (Low Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.169 0.326 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.784 0.058 0.199 
             Panel B: Drawdown 
            Risk Premium (Full Sample) Risk Premium 0.020 0.000 0.777 0.344 0.507 0.197 0.189 0.334 0.946 0.150 0.085 
Risk Premium (High Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.067 0.040 0.461 0.828 0.798 0.618 0.783 0.512 0.995 0.271 0.001 
Risk Premium (Low Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.022 0.000 0.028 0.657 0.507 0.056 0.009 0.019 0.998 0.297 0.095 
  Standard deviation of returns 
           
Risk Premium (Full Sample) Risk Premium 0.153 0.000 0.459 0.348 0.565 0.360 0.166 0.181 0.749 0.529 0.100 
Risk Premium (High Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.096 0.036 0.412 0.842 0.873 0.872 0.458 0.115 0.964 0.481 0.000 
Risk Premium (Low Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.005 0.000 0.070 0.500 0.4351 0.068 0.000 0.0001 0.917 0.469 0.072 
             Nominal returns 
            
Risk Premium (Full Sample) Risk Premium 0.250 0.000 0.539 0.523 0.486 0.320 0.016 0.202 0.962 0.117 0.105 
Risk Premium (High Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.440 0.104 0.900 0.762 0.801 0.759 0.687 0.663 0.998 0.164 0.000 
Risk Premium (Low Risk 1/2) Risk Premium 0.274 0.001 0.034 0.631 0.388 0.158 0.006 0.010 0.933 0.31 0.110 
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests following a vector autoregression. Only the results relevant to the risk premium variable are presented 




   
Fig. 1. 
British bank returns, 1830-2010. 
Notes: The banking crises documented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) are highlighted. Failed/nationalised banks are removed from sample at point of failure/nationalisation.  
















































































































































































































Annual volatility of British bank returns, 1830-2010. 
Notes: Annual volatility is calculated using the standard deviation of monthly bank returns. The banking crises documented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) are highlighted. 




















































































































































































































































































Monthly returns of British banks, 1830-2010. 
Notes: The banking crises documented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) are highlighted. Failed/nationalised banks are removed from sample at point of failure/nationalisation.  























































































































































































































































































Fig. 4.  
Impulse response functions of banking instability (order 1). 
Notes: These VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions are estimated using annual data from 1860-2010, the ordering of the variables is as shown above. 
















































































































































































































Impulse response functions of banking instability (order 2). 
Notes: These VAR Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions are estimated using annual data from 1860-2010, the ordering of the variables is as shown above. Each 





















































































































































































































UK corporate bond risk premium, 1860-2010. 
Notes: The corporate bond risk premium is the excess of current yield on debentures over and above Consols or high-coupon, long-dated government bonds.  The corporate bond 
risk premium over government bonds is further categorised into two subsets of High Risk Premium 1/2 (highest 50% of yields) and Low Risk Premium 1/2 (lowest 50% of 
yields). Highlighted banking crises are those discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  
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Appendix Table 1. 
Data sources. 
Data Year Variable Source  
Bank Share Prices and 
Market Capitalisation 
1830-2010 Bank returns Course of the Exchange (1830-1868) 
  The Scotsman (1834-1867, 1930-1938) 
   Belfast Newsletter (1830-1868) 
 
 
  Investor’s Monthly Manual (1869-1929) 
Banking Almanac and Yearbook (1845-1930) 
   The Times and Global Financial Data (1930-1964) 
   Thomson Reuters Datastream (1965-2010) 
    
Money Supply (M3) 1834-1869  M3 growth Gregory (1936); Holmes, and Greene (1986)*   
 1870-1982  Capie and Webber (1985) 
 1983-1985  BIS Annual Reports (1983-1986) 
 1986-2010  Bank of England Interactive Database (2011) 
    
Interest Rate 1830-2010 Real interest 
rate 
Officer (2011) 
   
Dollar Exchange Rate 1830-2010 Exchange rate Officer (2011) 
    
GDP 1830-2010 Real GDP 
growth 
Officer (2011) 
    
CPI 1830-2003 Inflation O’Donoghue, et al. (2004) 
 2004-2010  ONS 
    
Equity Returns 1825-1870 Real equity 
returns 
Acheson et al. (2009)  
 1871-1899 Grossman (2002) 
 1900-2009  Dimson et al. (2011) 
 2010  Barclays (2011) 
    
Consols/Government 
Bonds 
1830-1840 Risk premium Mitchell  (1988) 
1840-1871  Course of the Exchange (1840-1871) 
 1871-1913  Annual Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom (1871-1913) 
 1914-2009  Dimson et al. (2011) 
 2010  Barclays (2011) 
    
Corporate Bond Yield 1860-1863 Risk premium Course of the Exchange (1860-63) 
 1864-1929  Investor’s Monthly Manual (1864-1929)** 
 1930-2002  Stock Exchange Daily Official List (1930-2002) 
 2003-2010  Bloomberg  
    
Wheat Price 1820-1980 Wheat price 
growth 
Mitchell (1988) 
 1980-2010 London Gazette (1980-2010) 
    
Net Public Debt 1830-1950 Net public debt 
growth 
Mitchell (1988) 
 1951-2010 National Income and Expenditure (1956-1983), Public Expenditure  
Statistical Analyses (1998-2010) 
    
Housing Prices 1900-1945 Housing price 
growth 
Liesner (1989) 
 1946-2010 Department for Communities and Local Govt. (2011) 
    
Bank Lending 1860-1880 Bank lending 
growth 
 
The Bankers’ Magazine (1859-1881)*** 
 1881-1962 Sheppard (1971) 
  1963-2010 Bank of England Interactive Database (2011) 
Notes: *Average deposit growth in London and Westminster, London and County and Midland banks used as proxy for money supply growth 1834-
1969. ** Investor’s Monthly Manual is made available for the years 1869-1930 by the International Center for Finance (ICF) at Yale University. 
***Average lending growth of the twenty largest banks for which balance sheet information is available is used as a proxy for bank lending growth 
1860-1881. 
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Appendix Table 2. 









































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel A: 1860-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.047 0.581 0.023 0.010 0.899 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.298 0.029 0.146 
 
Risk Premium 0.018 0.000 0.104 0.340 0.345 0.556 0.242 0.249 0.639 0.540 0.137 
 
 
GDP 0.029 0.903 0.052 0.934 0.002 0.072 0.145 0.216 0.397 0.041 0.042 
 
 
M3 0.059 0.399 0.252 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.398 0.000 0.003 0.059 
 
 
Inflation 0.020 0.027 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.151 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.094 
 
 
Interest 0.060 0.032 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 
 
 
Exchange Rate 0.160 0.371 0.331 0.257 0.171 0.198 0.971 0.623 0.068 0.485 0.225 
 
 
Public Debt 0.157 0.193 0.050 0.004 0.456 0.280 0.337 0.188 0.005 0.000 0.129 
 
 
Wheat Price 0.030 0.429 0.278 0.288 0.057 0.130 0.213 0.026 0.000 0.183 0.013 
 
 
Equity 0.862 0.088 0.118 0.000 0.073 0.997 0.312 0.137 0.342 0.263 0.231 
 
 
Lending 0.131 0.028 0.402 0.939 0.119 0.031 0.277 0.458 0.201 0.221 0.565 
 
              
Panel B: 1835-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.041  0.013  0.832 0.083 0.009 0.000 0.945 0.192 0.240  
Risk Premium             
 GDP 0.074  0.017  0.095 0.309 0.230 0.299 0.293 0.044 0.132  
 M3 0.094  0.617  0.055 0.000 0.281 0.130 0.031 0.000 0.104  
 Inflation 0.740  0.750  0.012 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.333  
 Interest 0.763  0.908  0.020 0.345 0.001 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.370  
 Exchange Rate 0.521  0.550  0.274 0.031 0.986 0.748 0.000 0.882 0.234  
 Public Debt 0.166  0.048  0.744 0.484 0.230 0.093 0.701 0.000 0.230  
 Wheat Price 0.179  0.911  0.024 0.260 0.420 0.028 0.048 0.366 0.044  
 Equity 0.968  0.328  0.218 0.937 0.023 0.019 0.152 0.832 0.162  
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests. The exchange rate is differenced to ensure stationarity. 
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Appendix Table 2 Cont. 








































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel C: 1901-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.039 0.845 0.035 0.017 0.732 0.088 0.009 0.000 0.754 0.036 0.149 0.168 
Risk Premium 0.048 0.000 0.255 0.300 0.524 0.331 0.486 0.436 0.991 0.561 0.133 0.278 
 
GDP 0.010 0.651 0.100 0.958 0.001 0.096 0.027 0.053 0.761 0.071 0.076 0.062 
 
M3 0.023 0.184 0.176 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.086 0.115 0.059 0.005 0.231 0.291 
 
Inflation 0.087 0.030 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.005 0.254 0.000 0.097 0.784 
 
Interest 0.114 0.036 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.066 0.001 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.076 0.881 
 
Exchange Rate 0.090 0.450 0.052 0.001 0.073 0.259 0.761 0.188 0.000 0.690 0.276 0.044 
 
Public Debt 0.223 0.295 0.117 0.012 0.949 0.306 0.748 0.640 0.712 0.000 0.191 0.516 
 
Wheat Price 0.025 0.262 0.193 0.231 0.109 0.367 0.046 0.001 0.722 0.159 0.012 0.448 
 
Equity 0.574 0.079 0.018 0.002 0.067 1.000 0.073 0.031 0.546 0.103 0.269 0.229 
 
Lending 0.260 0.045 0.693 0.795 0.120 0.069 0.053 0.115 0.010 0.151 0.481 0.110 
 
House Prices 0.314 0.678 0.599 0.000 0.134 0.018 0.011 0.016 0.467 0.380 0.011 0.016 








Appendix Table 3. 







































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel A: 1860-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.001 0.770 0.083 0.016 0.638 0.919 0.008 0.072 0.043 0.681 0.376 
 
Risk Premium 0.020 0.000 0.777 0.344 0.507 0.197 0.189 0.334 0.946 0.150 0.085 
 
 
GDP 0.663 0.960 0.078 0.926 0.008 0.087 0.005 0.031 0.443 0.043 0.047 
 
 
M3 0.093 0.534 0.009 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.188 0.000 0.022 0.139 
 
 
Inflation 0.067 0.100 0.112 0.003 0.002 0.082 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.088 
 
 
Interest 0.065 0.099 0.119 0.008 0.005 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 
 
 
fExchange Rate 0.133 0.492 0.081 0.298 0.215 0.260 0.842 0.947 0.053 0.777 0.328 
 
 
Public Debt 0.039 0.151 0.074 0.016 0.680 0.128 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.039 
 
 
Wheat Price 0.219 0.869 0.448 0.312 0.160 0.156 0.968 0.104 0.002 0.117 0.016 
 
 
Equity 0.012 0.616 0.117 0.001 0.090 0.309 0.031 0.006 0.131 0.177 0.144 
 
 
Lending 0.236 0.087 0.742 0.915 0.093 0.031 0.554 0.788 0.244 0.245 0.583 
 
              
Panel B: 1835-
2010 




0.639 0.160 0.049 0.069 0.266 0.914 0.382 
 
Risk Premium 



























0.014 0.181 0.003 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.398 
 
 




0.289 0.109 0.476 0.715 0.001 0.671 0.212 
 
 




0.785 0.848 0.013 0.008 0.438 0.000 0.157 
 
 











0.384 0.257 0.012 0.002 0.164 0.828 0.158 
 
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests. The exchange rate is differenced to ensure stationarity. 
 52 
 
Appendix Table 3 cont. 







































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel C: 1901-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.006 0.651 0.066 0.241 0.241 0.729 0.000 0.015 0.197 0.621 0.360 0.623 
Risk Premium 0.000 0.000 0.852 0.382 0.619 0.079 0.353 0.493 0.830 0.282 0.061 0.008 
 
GDP 0.658 0.729 0.081 0.788 0.003 0.080 0.037 0.077 0.638 0.066 0.102 0.023 
 
M3 0.050 0.179 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.436 0.062 0.036 0.464 0.710 
 
Inflation 0.289 0.113 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.001 0.011 0.126 0.000 0.120 0.429 
 
Interest 0.274 0.145 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.043 0.002 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.109 0.870 
 
Exchange Rate 0.163 0.610 0.010 0.001 0.413 0.181 0.739 0.375 0.000 0.309 0.153 0.048 
 
Public Debt 0.048 0.148 0.147 0.086 0.870 0.117 0.091 0.001 0.678 0.000 0.061 0.521 
 
Wheat Price 0.280 0.645 0.381 0.381 0.224 0.515 0.254 0.002 0.201 0.110 0.016 0.095 
 
Equity 0.025 0.687 0.062 0.009 0.087 0.425 0.001 0.000 0.499 0.095 0.168 0.268 
 
Lending 0.549 0.144 0.875 0.816 0.089 0.118 0.057 0.152 0.010 0.213 0.395 0.181 
 
House Prices 0.275 0.961 0.531 0.000 0.378 0.023 0.003 0.002 0.502 0.350 0.007 0.025 









Appendix Table 4. 








































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel A: 1860-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.473 0.196 0.167 0.017 0.659 0.888 0.000 0.001 0.075 0.139 0.151  
Risk Premium 0.250 0.000 0.539 0.523 0.486 0.320 0.016 0.202 0.962 0.117 0.105  
 
GDP 0.725 0.966 0.195 0.898 0.061 0.074 0.060 0.061 0.462 0.049 0.042  
 
M3 0.035 0.152 0.062 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.499 0.000 0.004 0.202  
 
Inflation 0.100 0.201 0.033 0.006 0.002 0.265 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.071  
 
Interest 0.091 0.209 0.043 0.013 0.005 0.228 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057  
 
Exchange Rate 0.438 0.567 0.376 0.260 0.236 0.266 0.768 0.980 0.058 0.945 0.319  
 
Public Debt 0.207 0.195 0.445 0.019 0.531 0.153 0.015 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.074  
 
Wheat Price 0.850 0.906 0.767 0.314 0.134 0.158 0.937 0.173 0.002 0.091 0.017  
 
Equity 0.174 0.265 0.617 0.001 0.036 0.642 0.012 0.009 0.130 0.127 0.132  
 
Lending 0.191 0.035 0.963 0.911 0.107 0.048 0.661 0.759 0.277 0.181 0.597  








0.874 0.358 0.000 0.001 0.174 0.494 0.253  
Risk Premium 

























0.018 0.339 0.006 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.331  
 




0.328 0.079 0.252 0.909 0.000 0.620 0.186  
 




0.894 0.678 0.087 0.022 0.726 0.000 0.178  
 










0.191 0.706 0.001 0.002 0.154 0.719 0.216  
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests. The exchange rate is differenced to ensure stationarity. 
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Appendix Table 4 cont. 






































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel C: 1901-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.567 0.043 0.146 0.049 0.416 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.645 0.124 0.086 0.556 
Risk Premium 0.027 0.000 0.155 0.626 0.660 0.138 0.051 0.439 0.742 0.134 0.041 0.009 
 
GDP 0.860 0.737 0.560 0.863 0.003 0.121 0.065 0.109 0.623 0.080 0.081 0.050 
 
M3 0.009 0.040 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.817 0.869 0.032 0.009 0.591 0.642 
 
Inflation 0.427 0.103 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.009 0.077 0.000 0.086 0.542 
 
Interest 0.482 0.098 0.072 0.000 0.001 0.127 0.005 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.068 0.899 
 
Exchange Rate 0.481 0.646 0.183 0.000 0.231 0.141 0.983 0.443 0.000 0.406 0.186 0.051 
 
Public Debt 0.219 0.266 0.400 0.110 0.957 0.209 0.556 0.180 0.871 0.000 0.127 0.702 
 
Wheat Price 0.980 0.692 0.827 0.278 0.180 0.419 0.395 0.003 0.227 0.101 0.020 0.220 
 
Equity 0.314 0.195 0.342 0.005 0.050 0.918 0.008 0.004 0.482 0.091 0.141 0.366 
 
Lending 0.398 0.055 0.979 0.768 0.094 0.130 0.166 0.250 0.010 0.162 0.397 0.221 
 
House Prices 0.409 0.683 0.492 0.000 0.330 0.031 0.003 0.004 0.401 0.237 0.008 0.053 









Appendix Table 5. 








































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel A: 1860-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.000 0.100 0.470 0.039 0.574 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.016 0.336 0.086  
Risk Premium 0.153 0.000 0.459 0.348 0.565 0.360 0.166 0.181 0.749 0.529 0.100  
 
GDP 0.004 0.735 0.075 0.863 0.010 0.063 0.366 0.603 0.448 0.070 0.059  
 
M3 0.903 0.527 0.066 0.035 0.001 0.000 0.486 0.530 0.000 0.020 0.092  
 
Inflation 0.066 0.022 0.028 0.006 0.001 0.249 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.099  
 
Interest 0.068 0.020 0.037 0.013 0.004 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.072  
 
Exchange Rate 0.130 0.356 0.514 0.307 0.222 0.222 0.862 0.973 0.030 0.587 0.504  
 
Public Debt 0.128 0.162 0.119 0.004 0.486 0.173 0.238 0.164 0.004 0.000 0.028  
 
Wheat Price 0.006 0.409 0.596 0.276 0.166 0.203 0.214 0.015 0.000 0.182 0.031  
 
Equity 0.784 0.098 0.129 0.001 0.062 0.985 0.336 0.176 0.354 0.206 0.146  
 
Lending 0.021 0.033 0.341 0.926 0.135 0.027 0.644 0.624 0.223 0.149 0.415  








0.512 0.752 0.031 0.000 0.174 0.093 0.063  
Risk Premium 

























0.018 0.374 0.004 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.513  
 




0.378 0.051 0.700 0.946 0.000 0.940 0.436  
 




0.891 0.556 0.196 0.112 0.876 0.000 0.116  
 










0.200 0.954 0.076 0.042 0.073 0.775 0.143  




Appendix Table 5 cont. 









































(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
Panel C: 1901-
2010 
Bank Instability 0.000 0.335 0.475 0.152 0.451 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.695 0.222 0.098 0.094 
Risk Premium 0.455 0.000 0.739 0.330 0.721 0.333 0.373 0.390 0.932 0.613 0.083 0.259 
 
GDP 0.002 0.494 0.217 0.833 0.010 0.020 0.060 0.159 0.831 0.094 0.174 0.085 
 
M3 0.928 0.444 0.235 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.258 0.189 0.058 0.051 0.313 0.508 
 
Inflation 0.433 0.042 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.272 0.001 0.008 0.148 0.000 0.115 0.708 
 
Interest 0.306 0.034 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.087 0.923 
 
Exchange Rate 0.116 0.730 0.054 0.000 0.395 0.281 0.876 0.616 0.000 0.450 0.415 0.115 
 
Public Debt 0.157 0.292 0.146 0.011 0.980 0.346 0.376 0.156 0.746 0.000 0.060 0.575 
 
Wheat Price 0.009 0.388 0.505 0.304 0.219 0.434 0.130 0.002 0.324 0.156 0.043 0.148 
 
Equity 0.178 0.049 0.025 0.001 0.019 0.910 0.164 0.062 0.422 0.050 0.109 0.184 
 
Lending 0.032 0.040 0.678 0.750 0.078 0.066 0.412 0.300 0.002 0.101 0.315 0.530 
 
House Prices 0.041 0.625 0.637 0.000 0.536 0.014 0.002 0.005 0.604 0.477 0.013 0.153 
Notes: Each row represents the p-values from Granger causality tests. The exchange rate is differenced to ensure stationarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
